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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FEME SOLE ESTATE AND
THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT'S CREATION OF AN 'HOMME
SOLE' ESTATE IN JACOBS v. MEADE
On April 27, 1984, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Jacobs v. Meade,1
was confronted with a constitutional challenge in the sensitive area of
gender-based classifications. The object of the assault was the separate
equitable estate, or feme sole2 estate. Historically, the feme sole estate
was a method of holding property available exclusively to women. In Ja-
cobs v. Meade, it was contended that since a man possessed no corre-
sponding right to create a separate equitable estate, the feme sole estate
was constitutionally defective on equal protection grounds.3
The Jacobs court resolved the issue through a process of statutory con-
struction. It held that, by implication, a man has the ability to acquire
property as an homme sole estate. This interpretation removed the possi-
bility of constitutional infirmity.
This comment will first sketch the historical background of the feme
sole estate, its development in Virginia, and the Idgal climate preceding
Jacobs v. Meade. It will then focus on the propriety of the Virginia Su-
preme Court's decision and discuss the probable outcome had an alterna-
tive method of analysis been employed. Finally, this comment will ex-
amine the practical effect of the creation of the homme sole estate and its
implications in the area of spousal disinheritance.
I. THE LAW BEFORE Jacobs v. Meade
A. Historical Background of the Feme Sole Estate
The separate equitable estate, or feme sole estate, was originally a de-
vice created by the English equity courts to modify the disabilities which
the common law imposed upon married women with respect to their
property rights.4 By the eighteenth century, it became possible for a wife
1. 227 Va. -, 315 S.E.2d 383 (1984).
2. A "feme sole" usually refers to an unmarried woman, a widow, a divorced woman or a
woman who has been judicially separated from her husband. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556
(5th ed. 1979). However, the term is also used with respect to a married woman who holds
property as her sole and separate equitable estate. See J. KELLY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS FOR MARRIED WOMEN 233-34 (1882).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. At common law, a married woman's contract was invalid and null against her. 9B
MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE Husband and Wife § 4 (Repl. Vol. 1984). A married woman was
also unable to convey her realty or encumber her freehold estate without her husband's
concurrence; if a husband and wife sold and conveyed her lands, the proceeds belonged to
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to have an estate and income free from the control of her husband, a
separate equitable estate which could give her virtual economic indepen-
dence. This was usually accomplished by means of a "sole and separate
use" trust for the benefit of the wife. Legal title to property was conveyed
to a trustee who had the duty of managing and disposing of the property
in accordance with the wife's wishes. The role of trustee could be filled by
a third party, by the husband, or even by the wife herself. To insure that
the property would be held free from the husband's control and from lia-
bility for his debts, the trust instrument had to contain an express provi-
sion to that effect. If the settlor of the trust did not explicitly insert such
a provision, the husband would immediately acquire an interest in the
wife's equitable estate. If designed effectively, however, the separate equi-
table estate, as created by a separate use trust, enabled a married woman
to sell, mortgage, contract, or devise her property.
5
In the late nineteenth century, Virginia, along with other common law
states, enacted a series of statutes known as the married women's prop-
erty acts. These statutes enlarged the personal rights of married women
and secured to them separate legal estates over which they had almost
unlimited control. One writer has stated that this legislation rendered the
separate equitable estate obsolete,' but reference to the applicable Vir-
ginia statutes and case law shows that the separate equitable estate re-
tains its viability today as a potential device to exclude the wife's real
property from the husband's curtesy s
the husband without any reservation of rights on the wife's behalf. Id. § 6. "[The] presump-
tions of the common law [that husband and wife are one person and that the wife was under
the controlling influence of the husband], from a business standpoint, effectually tied the
hands of a married woman and (aided by the common law rule that her personalty becomes
vested in the husband immediately upon marriage) reduced her to a condition of pupilage
and dependence upon her husband .... " 2 R. MINOR, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1004
(F. Ribble 2d ed. 1928) (emphasis in original).
5. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 5.50-.56 (A. Casner ed. 1952). For a discussion of
the married woman's ability to contract concerning property held as her sole and separate
equitable estate, see generally J. KELLY, supra note 2, at 230-37.
6. For an analysis of the effect of the first married women's property act in Virginia, see
generally M. BURKS, NOTES ON THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF MARRIED WOMEN IN VIRGINIA 59-77
(1894). The modern version of these statutes is found in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-35 to -47.1
(Repl. Vol. 1981 & Cure. Supp. 1984).
7. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.55-.56 (A. Casner ed. 1952). But see Rappeport, The
Equitable Separate Estate and Restraints on Anticipation: Its Modern Significance, 11
MIAMI L.Q. 85 (1956).
8. Curtesy today, like dower, consists of a surviving spouse's fee simple interest in one
third of all the real estate whereof the deceased spouse or any other to his use was at any
time seised during coverture of an estate of inheritance, unless the right has been lawfully
barred or relinquished. VA. CODE. ANN. § 64.1-19 (Repl. Vol. 1980). See generally 1 R. MI-
NOR, supra note 4, §§ 217-245 (for a historical overview); Lewis, It's Time to Abolish Dower
and Curtesy in Virginia, 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 299 (1969) (proposes the abolition of dower and
curtesy as part of a complete revision of the law of decedents' estates in Virginia); 5C
MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE Curtesy §§ 1-14 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
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B. Acceptance in Virginia
Although conceived as a creature of equity, the separate equitable es-
tate is expressly acknowledged in the Code of Virginia under section 55-
47.9 Similarly, section 55-35, which defines how a married woman may
acquire and dispose of property, states that a husband has curtesy rights
in real estate owned by his wife with the exception of any real estate held
as part of her separate equitable estate.'0 The most explicit reference to
the separate equitable estate as a method of barring a husband's curtesy
in his deceased wife's real estate is found in section 64.1-21."" Under this
section a surviving husband is not entitled to curtesy in the separate eq-
uitable estate of his wife if the right has been expressly excluded by the
instrument creating the estate or if the creating instrument simply de-
scribes the estate as her sole and separate equitable estate.
The Virginia Supreme Court has consistently emphasized that the feme
sole estate has an independent, extra-statutory existence.12 By the late
nineteenth century, a separate equitable estate could be created for a wo-
man with relative ease. In Dezendorf v. Humphreys, 3 the court held that
a will devising property to a married woman "to have for her sole and
separate use during her life"' 4 created a separate equitable estate. 5 More-
over, the interposition of a trustee was deemed unnecessary to create such
an estate. 6 Under former Virginia law, a woman's power to dispose of
feme sole real estate during the marriage or by will (thus excluding the
husband from curtesy) had to be vested in her by the creating instru-
The Virginia Code also provides that if a wife conveys, devises or bequeaths any estate,
real or personal, to her husband with the intent that it be in lieu of curtesy, his curtesy in
the real estate is barred. However, the husband does retain the option of renouncing his
wife's will and thereby becoming entitled to curtesy in her estate. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-22
(Repl. Vol. 1980). The separate equitable estate is the more effective method of excluding
the husband's curtesy with respect to a specific piece of real property, especially in view of
the fact that no "renunciation" option exists. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-47 (Repl. Vol. 1981) states that "[n]othing contained in the preced-
ing sections of this chapter shall be construed to prevent the creation of equitable separate
estates. They may be created as heretofore and shall be held in all respects according to the
provisions of the instrument by which they are created and with all the powers conferred by
such instrument."
10. Id. § 55-35.
11. Id. § 64.1-21 (Repl. Vol. 1980). The most recent change in this statute was the 1980
amendment which added the words "or if such instrument executed heretofore or hereafter,
describes the estate as her sole and separate equitable estate."
12. See, e.g., Andes v. Roller, 98 Va. 620, 622, 37 S.E. 297, 297 (1900); Jones v. Jones, 96
Va. 749, 751, 32 S.E. 463, 463. (1899); Hutchings v. Commercial Bank, 91 Va. 68, 20 S.E. 950
(1895).
13. 95 Va. 473, 28 S.E. 880 (1898).
14. Id. at 474, 28 S.E. at 880.
15. Id. at 477, 28 S.E. at 881.
16. Id.
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ment. 7 Today, under section 64.1-21, as amended in 1980, a surviving
husband is not entitled to curtesy in his deceased wife's separate equita-
ble estate "if such instrument, executed heretofore or hereafter, describes
the estate as her sole and separate equitable estate."' 8 Thus, the trend in
Virginia has been to facilitate the creation of separate equitable estates in
women and to uphold the use of such estates as potential curtesy-barring
devices.' 9
C. The Legal Climate Prior to Jacobs v. Meade
The decade of the 1970's witnessed a proliferation of litigation before
the United States Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity
of gender-based laws under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 0 While a majority of the Court was reluctant to declare sex
a "suspect" classification triggering strict scrutiny,"' many laws which
made distinctions between males' and females were struck down under
less stringent tests.2" As it struggled to fashion an appropriate and worka-
ble standard to apply to gender-based criteria, the Court has appeared to
move from a posture of deference to legislative purpose, which is often
17. Whether the husband's marital rights were excluded by the instrument depended on
the intention of the grantor. See, e.g., Jones, 96 Va. at 752, 32 S.E. at 463; see also Kiracofe
v. Kiracofe, 93 Va. 591, 25 S.E. 601 (1896) (court construed the creating instrument as con-
taining an implied power to dispose of feme sole real estate by will, since the instrument did
not withhold such power); Dezendorf, 95 Va. 473, 28 S.E. 880 (creating instrument, the
wife's father's will, specifically prohibited the woman from conveying or encumbering the
property).
18. V. CODE ANN. § 64.1-21 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
19. A possible exception or modification of this trend might be discerned from the appar-
ent conflict between case law, which stated that if the husband himself were the creator of
his wife's separate equitable estate, his intention to divest himself of his curtesy would be
presumed. See, e.g., Jones, 96 Va. at 752, 32 S.E. at 464 and VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-20 (Repl.
Vol. 1980) (stating that the fact that a husband conveys real estate to his wife shall not
necessarily bar his curtesy in the property).
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (statutory
classifications which distinquish between males and females are "subject to scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause").
21. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Only four members of the Court
supported the view that sexual classifications "are inherently suspect and must therefore be
subjected to close judicial scrutiny." Id. at 682.
22. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (state statute said only men could be re-
quired to pay alimony following divorce; statute invalidated); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977) (under Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits Program,
survivors benefits were payable to the widow of a husband covered regardless of the degree
of her dependency, but benefits were payable to a widower of a wife covered only upon proof
of support; statute invalidated); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state statute allowed
women to purchase beer at a younger age than could men; statute invalidated); Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (widows, but not widowers, could collect survivors' bene-
fits under Social Security Act; statute struck down); Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (statute which pre-
ferred men to women as estate administrators struck down).
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called the "rational basis" or "minimum scrutiny" test," to a position of
"intermediate scrutiny."2 4 The formula of intermediate scrutiny is now
the incantation most frequently invoked by the Supreme Court in gender-
discrimination cases, although occasionally the former deference
resurfaces in certain contexts.25 Whatever the judicial test employed, it is
well settled that legal classifications based on sex alone and reflecting
"archaic and overbroad generalizations '2 continue to be "subject to scru-
tiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
'27
The time-honored feme sole estate was the attempted target of legal
reform in Virginia as early as 1968. In that year, the Virginia Code Com-
23. E.g., Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (stating that "[a] classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation . . . .' ") (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920)); see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (attempting
to find a rationale for Congress' actions, the Court speculated that "[i]n enacting and retain-
ing [the challenged statute] Congress may thus quite rationally have believed that women
line officers had less opportunity for promotion. . . ." (emphasis added)); Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (Court upheld a Florida statute which gave a property tax exemp-
tion to widows, but not to widowers, because "Florida's differing treatment of widows and
widowers 'rest[s] upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation . . . .' "). But see G. GUNTHER, CONSTUTIONAL LAW 792 n.3
(10th ed. 1980) (expressing the view that the Reed court was applying "deferential scrutiny
in theory but somewhat heightened scrutiny in fact."). See generally Note, Preferential Ec-
onomic Treatment for Women: Some Constitutional and Practical Implications of Kahn v.
Shevin, 28 VAND. L. REv. 843 (1975) (taking the position that Kahn v. Shevin represents a
retreat from heightened intermediate scrutiny). For the view that Kahn v. Shevin did not
apply the rational basis test, see Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the "Heightened Rationality
Test". Is the Supreme Court Promoting a Double Standard in Sex Discrimination Cases?,
32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 275 (1975).
24. This standard was articulated in Craig, 429 U.S. at 197, where the Court declared that
in order to survive constitutional challenge, "classifications by gender must serve important
government objectives and be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." For
a critical view of intermediate scrutiny, calling for the application of the strict scrutiny ad-
vocated by the Frontiero plurality, see Emden, Intermediate Tier Analysis of Sex Discrimi-
nation Cases: Legal Perpetuation of Traditional Myths, 43 ALB. L. REV. 73 (1978). For more
recent criticism see Seeburger, The Middle of the Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal
Protection, 48 Mo. L. REv. 587 (1983) (expressing the view that the Court, by employing
intermediate scrutiny, is making inconsistent, means-oriented value judgments to overturn
legislative choices). Specific suggestions for improving the quality of analysis in intermediate
scrutiny cases are found in Note, Refining the Methods of Middle-Tier Scrutiny: A New
Proposal for Equal Protection, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1501 (1983) (offering a method of defining
each element of the test with greater precision).
25. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981) (6-3 decision), where the Court up-
held draft registration for males only while according "a healthy deference" to congressional
decisions in the area of military affairs. See generally Note, Retreat from Intermediate
Scrutiny in Gender-Based Discrimination Cases, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 776 (1982) (call-
ing for a return to genuine intermediate scrutiny because a more lenient standard would
result in judicial approval of gender-based discrimination).
26. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
27. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75.
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mission proposed to the General Assembly that section 64-2228 be made
gender-neutral.2 9 The result would have been that a husband could hold
real property as his separate equitable estate and vitiate his widow's
dower interest. This suggestion was rejected by the General Assembly and
the statute remained essentially in its present form. Then, in 1977,
"[a]pparently in response to Frontiero and other Supreme Court deci-
sions involving gender-based classifications,"3 0 the General Assembly en-
acted section 64.1-19.1, which provides that the terms "dower" and
"curtesy" are to be regarded as synonymous for all purposes."' The con-
figuration of these two statutes would become significant when the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the feme sole es-
tate in Jacobs v. Meade.3
2
II. THE CASE OF Jacobs v. Meade
A. The Facts
In 1960, Leona C. Foltz and her then husband, Henry L. Foltz, pur-
chased a parcel of real estate in Prince William County as tenants by the
entirety with the right of survivorship.3 3 Henry Foltz died in 1975. His
widow, Leona, executed a will in 1976 devising this real estate to her
daughter and granddaughter. On April 8, 1977, Mrs. Foltz recorded a
feme sole deed conveying the property to herself as her sole and separate
equitable estate. That same day Mrs. Foltz married Jack E. Jacobs. Le-
ona Foltz Jacobs died in 1980. In February 1981, Jack Jacobs filed a re-
nunciation of his wife's will and sought to claim curtesy rights in her feme
sole real estate.
3 4
The case was heard in the Circuit Court of Prince William County on
July 9, 1981. The complainant, Jacobs, argued that section 64.1-21, which
states that a surviving husband is not entitled to curtesy in his deceased
wife's separate equitable estate, "is unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds because the statute fails to grant husbands the same rights
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 64-22 (1950). According to this provision, if a wife's creating instru-
ment expressly excluded curtesy, then the husband was not entitled to a share in his wife's
equitable estate. Id. § 64.1-21 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
29. REVISION OF TITLE 64 OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA: REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA CODE COM-
MISSION TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA, H.D. 5, Regular Session
(1968).
30. Jacobs v. Meade, 227 Va .... 315 S.E.2d 383, 384 (1984).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
32. 227 Va. -, 315 S.E.2d 383.
33. A tenancy by the entirety is defined as a "tenancy which is created between a hus-
band and wife and by which together they hold title to the whole with right of survivorship
so that, upon death of either, other takes whole to exclusion of deceased heirs." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1313-14 (5th ed. 1979).
34. Joint Appendix at 5, Jacobs v. Meade, 227 Va. -, 315 S.E.2d 383 (1984).
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granted wives." 35 The defendant, Cheryl Lynn Meade, as executrix of her
deceased mother's estate, claimed the exclusion of curtesy was proper be-
cause her mother had held the property as a separate equitable estate.
3 6
The circuit court declined to consider the constitutional question and
ruled in favor of the executrix. It held that section 64.1-21 must be con-
strued together with section 64.1-19.1, which states that the terms
"dower" and "curtesy" are synonymous for all purposes. Therefore, a
husband also had the ability to create a separate equitable estate with the
potential to bar his wife's dower rights.3 7 A fortiori, there was no constitu-
tional infirmity. The complainant, Jacobs, appealed to the Virginia Su-
preme Court.
B. The Virginia Supreme Court's Decision and Rationale
On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, Jacobs argued that the trial
court erred in not addressing the constitutionality of section 64.1-21,
38
and in not concluding that the statute violates the federal equal protec-
tion clause. Citing Frontiero v. Richardson,39 Jacobs asserted that the
statute violates the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution because it
permits a wife to exclude her husband's curtesy rights in real property
held as her separate equitable estate, without conferring a corresponding
right upon the husband.
40
The Virginia Supreme Court declined to reach the constitutional ques-
tion in Jacobs v. Meade.4' According to the court, the threshold question
was not whether it was constitutional for a wife to be able to create a
feme sole estate and thereby deprive her husband of his curtesy. Rather,
"[t]he dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the statutory law of Vir-
ginia enables a husband, as well as a wife, to acquire a sole and separate
equitable estate in real property."
4 2
The court looked for a permissible construction of section 64.1-21 be-
cause "[e]very act of the legislature is presumed to be constitutional.
Morever, 'a statute will be construed in such a manner as to avoid a con-
stitutional question wherever this is possible.' - The court pursued such
a construction by juxtaposing section 64.1-21 and section 64.1-19.1. 44 Sec-
35. 227 Va. at -, 315 S.E.2d at 384.
36. Id.
37. Joint Appendix at 19, Jacobs, 227 Va. -, 315 S.E.2d 383.
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-21 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
39. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See supra note 21.
40. Brief for Appellant at 18-20, Jacobs v. Meade, 227 Va. -, 315 S.E.2d 383 (1984)
(available in Virginia Supreme Court library).
41. 227 Va. -, 315 S.E.2d 383.
42. Id. at -, 315 S.E.2d at 385.
43. Id. (quoting Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 339, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940)).
44. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-19.1, -21 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
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tion 64.1-21 provides that "[a] surviving husband shall not be entitled to
curtesy in the equitable separate estate of the deceased wife if such right
thereto has been expressly excluded by the instrument creating the same,
or if such instrument, . . . describes the estate as her sole and separate
equitable estate. '45 Section 64.1-19.1 provides that "[w]here the word
'curtesy' appears in this chapter of the Code, it shall be taken to be sy-
nonymous with the word 'dower' as the same appears in this chapter or
this Code, and shall be so construed for all purposes."46
Section 64.1-19.1 had been applied only once prior to Jacobs v. Meade.
In God v. Hurt,47 the litigated issue arose from a contract with a married
woman for the purchase of real estate. The purchasers claimed they were
entitled to specific performance of the contract, together with an abate-
ment in the purchase price due to the refusal of the woman's husband to
release his curtesy rights. In searching for judicial precedent, the court in
God could only find cases discussing the applicable rule of law with re-
spect to an unreleased dower right. Due to the existence of section 64.1-
19.1, however, the court was able to apply the principles of the earlier
cases to the present situation of an unreleased curtesy right.48 The appli-
cation of section 64.1-19.1 to common law principles in God, however, of-
fered little guidance to the Jacobs court in its interpretation of section
64.1-21. The Jacobs court did observe that section 64.1-19.1 had been en-
acted "[a]pparently in response to Frontiero and other Supreme Court
decisions involving gender-based classifications .... ,41
The Jacobs court realized that the mere substitution in section 64.1-21
of the word "dower" for the word "curtesy," without more, would produce
an absurdity. It acknowledged that "[ult is the court's duty, however, to
construe statutes so as to avoid absurd results."5 By this reasoning, the
court felt free to substitute also the operative nouns and pronouns, such
as "wife" for "husband," "his" for "her," so that the statute would be
logically coherent. The Virginia Supreme Court ultimately held in Jacobs
that the application of section 64.1-19.1 to section 64.1-21 creates, by im-
plication, an homme sole estate. The court's interpretation means that,
pursuant to section 64.1-21, a husband has the ability to bar his widow's
dower rights. Since a man, as well as a woman, can have a separate equi-
table estate, there is no statutory gender discrimination in section 64.1-
21; an equal protection challenge is not viable."
45. Id. § 64.1-21.
46. Id. § 64.1-19.1.
47. 218 Va. 909, 241 S.E.2d 800, rev'd on other grounds on reh'g, 219 Va. 160, 247 S.E.2d
351 (1978).
48. Id. at 913, 241 S.E.2d at 803.
49. Jacobs, 227 Va. at -, 315 S.E.2d at 384.
50. Id. at -, 315 S.E.2d at 385.
51. At this point no appeal to the United States Supreme Court is planned. Telephone
interview with Robert Henry Klima, counsel for appellant (Aug. 10, 1984).
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS
A. The Constitutionality of the Feme Sole Estate-The Unanswered
Question
The focal point of the Jacobs v. Meade decision, creating an homme
sole estate, was the court's analysis of the interrelationship of two stat-
utes. It is a basic principle of constitutional adjudication that a court will
seek to avoid constitutional questions. Through its initial inquiry, a court
will normally determine whether a constitutional question may be
avoided through a rational construction of the particular statute.52 This is
precisely what the Jacobs court did. In the process, however, the court
missed an opportunity for further refinement of Virginia's approach to
the constitutionality of gender-based classifications.
Assume, hypothetically, that the 1968 Virginia General Assembly
(whose members rejected the proposal to make the predecessor of section
64.1-21 explicitly gender-neutral 53) were to be "resurrected" in order to
rewrite section 64.1-19.11" so that it would be inapplicable to section 64.1-
21. 55 Would section 64.1-21, which provides that a woman's separate equi-
table estate may exclude her husband's curtesy, be able to survive consti-
tutional scrutiny unaided by section 64.1-19.1?
Because the feme sole estate is a property-holding device available to
women and not to men, it embodies, superficially at least, a benign sex
classification. 6 "When sex classifications are defended as benign aids to
women, the Court applies exactly the same level of scrutiny as it does to
disadvantaging classifications: the Craig v. Boren intermediate level of
scrutiny governs .... ,,"1 Under the Craig standard, a gender-based clas-
sification must "serve important governmental objectives and be substan-
52. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also Ea-
ton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 339, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940) (Virginia enunciation of this
principle).
53. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19.1 (Repl. Vol. 1980).
55. Id. § 64.1-21.
56. See generally Erikson, Kahn, Ballard & Wiesenfeld, A New Equal Protection Test in
Reverse Discrimination Cases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1975) (warning that compensatory
laws that purport to help women actually foster sexual stereotyping and paternalism); Gins-
burg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REv. 813,
823 (1978) (which sees a continued but limited use of benign classifications and suggests
that the court "will uphold a gender classification justified as compensatory only if in fact
adopted by the legislature for remedial reasons rather than out of prejudice about 'the way
women (or men) are,' and even then, only if the classification neatly matches the remedial
end."); Kanowitz, "Benign" Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and Their Cure, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 1379 (1980) (proposing complete abrogation of the doctrine of benign discrimination in
the area of gender bias).
57. G. GUNTHER, supra note 23, at 791.
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tially related to the achievement of those objectives.""8
A survey of several major Supreme Court decisions which applied inter-
mediate scrutiny to laws characterized by their proponents as "benign"
(in the sense of being preferential or compensatory to women) reveals
that, in many instances, their asserted benignity did not save the chal-
lenged statutes. 59 "[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory pur-
pose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into
the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme."6 °
In Orr v. Orr,61 a landmark Supreme Court case in domestic relations
law, a majority of the Court voted to strike down an Alabama statute
which provided that only husbands could be made to pay alimony. Ala-
bama attempted to defend its statute on the ground that it served impor-
tant government objectives. The state's alleged objectives were to help
needy spouses and to compensate women for past discrimination during
marriage which rendered them ill-equipped to earn their own livings. The
Supreme Court noted, however, that the statute also provided for hear-
ings in which the parties' relative economic needs would be assessed.6 2
This was the fatal flaw. Although Alabama's purposes may have been le-
gitimate, gender-classification was unnecessary to effectuate those pur-
poses. In this case, the use of sex classifications could only produce "per-
verse results. '6 3  The Court concluded that "[a] gender-based
classification which. . . generates additional benefits only for those it has
no reason to prefer cannot survive equal protection scrutiny." 4
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,65 the Court considered
the constitutional validity of a state-supported nursing school's policy of
excluding men from enrollment for academic credit. Mississippi argued
that the women-only policy compensated women for discrimination in the
job market. As applied to a nursing school, however, this was a weak ar-
gument. Statistics demonstrate that nursing jobs are predominantly held
by women. Thus, while the Court acknowledged that "[iln limited cir-
cumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified
if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is dispro-
portionately burdened,"66 it found that women were not burdened with a
lack of opportunity in the nursing profession and struck down the statute.
In Hogan and Orr, the potential beneficiaries of the gender classifica-
58. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
59. See supra note 22 (with the exception of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
60. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
61. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
62. Id. at 281.
63. Id. at 282.
64. Id. at 282-83.
65. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
66. Id. at 728.
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tions were, respectively, financially secure (or non-needy) divorced women
and women in a predominantly female profession. The asserted compen-
satory purposes were either misconceived or ill-served by the discrimina-
tory classification.
Against this background, last year, in Schilling v. Bedford County Me-
morial Hospital, Inc.,6 7 the Virginia Supreme Court examined an inher-
ently gender-based common law doctrine, the doctrine of necessaries,
which makes a husband responsible for providing the elements of basic
subsistence for his wife, but which does not impose a similar duty on a
woman. Virginia applied the Craig v. Boren level of scrutiny and abol-
ished the doctrine. It characterized the necessaries doctrine as one "which
provided unequal benefits to men and women on the assumption that
women were more financially dependent." '68 Premised as it was on sweep-
ing, sex-based generalizations, the necessaries doctrine had to be
stricken. 9
In analyzing the constitutionality of the feme sole estate in the absence
of legislative history, one might posit that such an estate compensates
women for their relative economic disadvantages by enabling them to
hold property in a manner unavailable to men. The women benefitted by
such a classification, however, would be women owning real property,
women who may enjoy more financial advantages than many men. Today,
the feme sole estate is used primarily as a means of excluding a husband's
curtesy. Is this compensatory or retaliatory? The burden of such a classi-
fication could conceivably fall on a needy widower. The initial benefit
would be to a woman of property, giving her an option regarding that
property's disposition upon her death which is unavailable to a similarly
situated man. The direct beneficiary would be the person to whom the
woman devised her real estate; this devisee could be a woman or a man, a
needy person or an affluent person. Viewed from this perspective and
buttressed by the analysis of sex classification decisions discussed above,
it is difficult to conceive that the feme sole estate could pass constitu-
tional muster as a benign aid to women under the standards of Craig v.
Boren.7 0
67. 225 Va. 539, 303 S.E.2d 905 (1983).
68. Id. at 543-44, 303 S.E.2d at 908.
69. In Schilling, the Virginia Supreme Court decided that it would be inappropriate for
the court to cure the constitutional defect of the necessaries doctrine by extending its appli-
cation to wives because "this task, if advisable, is better left to the General Assembly." Id.
at 544, 303 S.E.2d at 908. For a discussion of the factors to be considered when deciding
whether to extend or to eliminate the necessaries doctrine, see Mahoney, Economic Sharing
During Marriage: Equal Protection, Spousal Support and the Doctrine of Necessaries, 22
J. FAN. L. 221, 237-44 (1984).
70. For recent state and federal cases dealing with related types of benign gender classifi-
cations, see generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.4th 910 (1982).
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B. The Homme Sole Estate
As a result of Jacobs v. Meade, a man can now acquire a separate equi-
table estate in real property with the ability to bar his wife's dower rights.
Thus, the situation is "evened up" with respect to a particular method of
spousal disinheritance. In the past, if a man wished to defeat his surviv-
ing spouse's dower rights in real property, he had to circumvent the
dower interest by acquiring the real estate as personal property (usually
through a corporation or a partnership) and by holding the property in a
probate-avoidance device.
7 1
These technicalities are no longer necessary. Now a man can block his
wife's dower interest as easily as she can defeat his curtesy interest. If one
believes that "turnabout is fair play," there is cause to rejoice in this de-
velopment. On the other hand, the Jacobs decision, while safeguarding
equal protection in the constitutional sense, has the practical result of
making males and females equally vulnerable to disinheritance by means
of the separate equitable estate. Because Jacobs has exacerbated the al-
ready vexing problem of spousal property rights at death, perhaps the
decision will stimulate legislative reform in this important area.
IV. CONCLUSION
The feme sole estate is a judicially created, statutorily sanctioned relic
of an earlier era when married women had little or no control over prop-
erty. In all probability, had the Virginia Supreme Court addressed the
substantive constitutional issue, the feme sole estate would not have sur-
vived constitutional scrutiny. By means of statutory construction, the
court effected the gender-neutralization of a property holding device for-
merly available only to women. This method of analysis preserved and
extended the separate equitable estate. With the creation in Jacobs v.
Meade of a corresponding homme sole estate, a historical method of
spousal disinheritance with respect to real property is now an option for
both men and women.
71. The two steps were necessary because if the property in question was acquired as real
property, the wife had a dower interest in it; if the property was acquired as personal prop-
erty and remained in the decedent's net probate personal estate, the widow could renounce
the will and take a fractional share of the net probate personal estate as provided in VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-16 (Repl. Vol. 1980). Thus, to prevent the surviving spouse from acquiring
any interest in the property the husband had to: (1) acquire the real estate as personal
property through a corporation or partnership, thus barring dower (because dower is an
interest in real property) and (2) place the personal property in a probate avoidance device
(such as an inter vivos trust over which he exercised a non-general power of appointment),
thus preventing the widow from claiming a forced statutory share in the property. See John-
son, Interspousal Property Rights at Death, 10 VA. BAR Assoc. J., Summer 1984, at 10, 13.
For an earlier, but more detailed, treatment, see generally Spies, Property Rights of the
Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L. REv. 157 (1960).
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From the perspective of a student of constitutional law seeking insight
into Virginia's approach to gender-based classifications, the decision
reached in Jacobs v. Meade is unenlightening. From the viewpoint of
those who value increased freedom of testation, the result is laudable.
Most significantly, however, for those who are concerned about the prop-
erty rights of surviving spouses in Virginia, Jacobs v. Meade represents
an additional complication of an already troublesome area.
Maria Dill

